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Introduction
In several OECD countries, employment rates of older workers are low relative to average rates, and the incidence of long-term unemployment is relatively high among them. For example, in Germany almost two thirds of all unemployed people aged 55 -64 years have been unemployed for more than a year, compared to roughly 40 percent in the total population. Only a few countries have comparable high long-term unemployment rates among older workers (OECD 2005a) . Furthermore, employment rates of elderly men and women in Germany are also quite low, both in absolute terms and compared to most other OECD countries.
Several reasons for the high level of long-term unemployment and low employment rates among elderly workers have been proposed both in the economics literature and the public policy debate (OECD 2005b) . These include: age differences in employment protection regulations, contract wages set by collective bargaining agreements, negative work incentives related to high income replacement ratios and long entitlement periods to out-of-work benefits, or a combination of these factors. One important effect of age-related employment protection regulations and collective bargaining agreements may be on age-earnings profiles.
In the presence of relatively steep age-earnings profiles, financial incentives to take up a lowpaying job for older unemployed people may be weak if the level of unemployment benefits is closely related to net earnings in the previous job. This is likely to be reinforced in the presence of extended unemployment-benefit entitlement periods which may be used as a bridge to early retirement by older workers.
The mentioned reasons for the strong concentration of long-term unemployment among older workers may be of particular importance for Germany, since there are special regulations for elderly workers in the employment protection law, relatively steep ageearnings profiles, and high income replacement ratios in the unemployment compensation and public pension systems (OECD 2005a) . Recently there has been a change in policy perspective in Germany, following examples in other European countries, to reduce financial incentives for early retirement and to foster re-employment of elderly unemployed workers by various forms of wage subsidies targeted at this group. However, empirical evidence seems to
show that participation in these programmes is very limited, and their labour market effects are rather uncertain (see, e.g., OECD 2005a: chapter 5) . This may be related to certain features of these programmes, such as time limits and their interaction with the tax-benefit system. Therefore, it is of great interest to design and implement policies with the aim to increase incentives for this group to reduce long-term unemployment and to raise the level of employment among older workers. Effective targeting of such policies is crucial, however, 2 because only policies which restrain budgetary costs are likely to be seriously considered by policy makers under current condition of fiscal constraints.
In this paper, we evaluate three policy reforms targeted at older unemployed people: (i) an hourly wage subsidy, (ii) an in-work credit, and (iii) a subsidy of social security contributions on low wages. The first reform proposal is similar to the Earnings Insurance scheme (Entgeltsicherung) recently introduced in Germany, the second and third are structured similarly to programmes already existing in, respectively, Britain and Belgium (see Blundell et al. 2000; Bargain et al. 2005) . The work incentive, labour supply and welfare effects of these hypothetical reforms are analysed on the basis of a detailed micro-simulation model for Germany which includes a structural household labour supply model. We find that the simulated employment effects of the three policy reforms would be rather similar and of moderate size, ranging between 20,000 and 30,000 additionally employed older women and between 10,000 and 20,000 older men. Our results also suggest that the hourly wage subsidy yields the highest welfare gains. However, all three reforms would yield positive income and welfare effects for the eligible population and would be 'self-financing' in the sense that induced increases in taxes and social security contributions outweigh the fiscal costs of the reform under the assumption that the eligible population can be restricted to previously unemployed people.
In the next section we provide important facts on labour market outcomes and some institutional background on the tax-benefit system and public policies targeted at elderly people in Germany which motivate the three policy reform proposals presented in section 3.
The empirical methodology on the basis of which we analyse the work incentive, labour supply and welfare effects of the three policy reforms is set out in section 4. Simulation results of these effects are summarized and discussed in section 4, and welfare implications of the reforms are analysed in section 5: Section 6 summarises the main results of the study and concludes with some policy implications.
Empirical and Institutional Background
We start with some stylised facts on labour market outcomes across age groups based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). 1 The data refer to the year 2003. The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25-64 to avoid distortions related to educational transitions and regular retirement, which are not analysed in this paper.
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As already mentioned in the introduction, the incidence of long-term unemployment among older people is very high in Germany. Table 1 also reveals large differences in employment rates between age groups. For both men and women, employment rates of people (including the self-employed) aged between 55 and 64 years are low compared to other age groups. In particular, there is a huge difference in employment rates between the oldest age group and those aged between 45 and 54 years, both for men and women. These age differences in employment rates might be related to the widespread use of early retirement schemes in conjunction with the unemployment insurance system, as described below.
For both men and women, the unconditional average working hours (including zero hours of non-employed people in the respective age group) also show a marked decline for the highest age group, which is mainly related to the low employment rates in this age group.
Turning to the distribution of hours of workers only, Table 1 shows that conditional hours are relatively constant across age groups, both for women and men, and that employed men work substantially more hours than women in each age group.
Since employment rates for older workers are relatively low, looking only at the observed wages could bias the age profile of wages due to well-known selection-effects (Heckman 1979 , Blundell et al., 2003 . In Table 2 , we therefore not only report observed wages of dependently employed workers but also for the total population; that is, the observed wages for the working and the expected wages for the non working population, where the latter are derived from selectivity-corrected wage regressions summarized in Table A1 in the appendix. Comparing the average observed wages conditional on employment and the unconditional wages for the whole population, we find evidence for selection effects in the distribution of wages. For both men and women, mean hourly wages conditional on working exceed mean wages estimated for the whole population by more than 2 Euro, on average. Regarding age effects, the striking difference is that average wages for the working population are on average increasing with age, with hourly wages in the oldest age group exceeding the mean by roughly 3 Euro for men and about 1 Euro for women. Controlling for selection effects, estimated hourly wages for both older men and women are very close to the average wage in the male and female population, although there is a significant wage reduction relative to the 5 hourly wage estimated for the age group 45 -54 years. Regarding the low-wage sector (25%-tile of gross hourly wages), the hourly wage in the oldest age group is only slightly above the average wage in the total population, and there is also only a relatively small wage reduction relative to the age group 45 -54 years.
How can age differences in labour market outcomes described above be related to institutional regulations concerning elderly people? One important factor contributing to longterm unemployment among older people might be employment protection regulation. In Germany, the Protection Against Dismissal Act ('Kündigungsschutzgesetz') provides general rules for the termination of employment contracts by the employer as well as special regulations for particular groups of employees, especially elderly workers. 
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One important institutional reason for the low employment rate among older workers is the prevalence of early retirement in Germany. 2 While the official retirement age is currently set at 65, the effective retirement age is substantially below this age. Until the year 1996 insured persons were eligible for an old age pension without any specific deductions at the age of 60 if they were unemployed, had a minimum insurance record of at least 15 years and made contributions to the public pension scheme for at least 8 out of the last 10 years prior to retirement. Starting from 1997, the retirement age without deductions was gradually increased to age 65 by the year 2001. However, there still exists the opportunity to retire early, though the pension received is reduced by 3.6% for each year before the age of 65 the pension is taken. The age threshold for eligibility for an old age pension with deductions after being unemployed was age 60 until the end of the year 2005. It was raised to age 61 in 2006, 62 in 2007, and 63 in 2008 . After the year 2011, the specific regulations for the retirement age of the unemployed will be abolished completely. In the past, the attractiveness of early retirement following a period of unemployment was also due to a long entitlement period to unemployment benefits for the older unemployed. As described above, this has recently been changed, however. Moreover, persons at age 58 were allowed to receive unemployment benefits even if they stated that they did not want to take up a job. The specific regulation for unemployment benefits for those of age 58 and older will be abolished in 2008.
In addition to these passive measures of labour market policy, there also exists a number of active policies targeted at elderly unemployed people. Of special importance for our analysis are two such measures:
The first is a wage subsidy named 'Eingliederungszuschuss' (EGZ) which is paid to firms employing elderly people (initially defined as 55 years or older, but subsequently reduced to the age of 50) covering both a share of the employees gross wage and the employers' share of social security contributions (see OECD 2005a: 144) . The duration and the amount of the subsidy are the highest for elderly people, amounting to a maximum of 70% of standardized wage costs for a period of up to 70 months (with reductions in the amount of the subsidy after 24 months). Neither the employer nor the employee is legally entitled to this subsidy, though, and part of it might have to be repaid if the employment relationship is terminated within a pre-specified period.. The EGZ, which was initially introduced at a temporary basis until the end of 2005 has meanwhile been extended until the end of 2007.
The number of elderly people subsidised by EGZ has increased substantially over the last couple of years (see Ammermüller et al. 2006 ).
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In 2003 a wage subsidy called Earnings Insurance ('Entgeltsicherung') was introduced.
It is intended to provide financial incentives for unemployed workers older than 50 to take up jobs with a wage below the level of the previously held job by way of a wage subsidy. The amount of this subsidy is 50% of the differential between the former salary and the net remuneration in the new job, the subsidy period depends on the previous entitlement period to UB I. Only a few people have participated in this programme so far (see Ammermüller et al., 2006) . The subsidy was initially planned to expire at the end of 2005 but has subsequently been prolonged until the end of 2007,
Although not explicitly targeted at older people, special regulations regarding subsidies to social security contributions paid on 'marginal' jobs may also be relevant for the employment of older workers. The so-called 'Mini Jobs' reform made already existing special regulations somewhat more generous: the maximum hours restriction 15 hours per week) was abolished, the range of earnings completely exempted from employees' social security contributions was expanded up to 400 Euro, with earnings between 401 and 800 Euro subject to a reduced contribution rate starting at 4 percent and increasing linearly up to the normal rate of 21 percent at the end of the bracket. However, for persons receiving unemployment or social assistance benefits, work incentives hardly changed due to this reform since earnings from mini-jobs are almost completely offset by benefit withdrawal due to the means tests applied to these transfers (see .
Making Work Pay: Three Policy Reforms
The preceding analysis suggests that specific regulations concerning elderly people and agerelated difference in labour market outcomes and the wage distribution are key for the employability of older people. These differences motivate policies targeted at elderly people aimed at improving their employability, as have already been implemented in various countries of the European Union. Here, we focus on three policy reforms:
(i) an hourly wage subsidy,
(ii) an in-work credit, and (iii) a subsidy of social security contributions on low earnings in a full-time job.
The first reform proposal is similar to the Earnings Insurance scheme recently introduced in Germany (see section 2), the second and third are structured similarly as programmes already existing in, respectively, Britain and Belgium (see Blundell et al. 2000; Bargain and Orsini 2006) . The main difference to these already existing programmes is that all three proposals analysed here are targeted at unemployed older people. The main characteristics of these reforms are summarized in the following table. 
(i) Hourly Wage Subsidy (HWS)
The idea of the HWS is to provide financial incentives to unemployed elderly people to take up a low-paying job, relative to the wage earned in the previous job. This subsidy is meant to close the gap between the reservation wage and the market wage of older unemployed people.
In contrast to the already existing Earnings Insurance mentioned above, the HWS is a subsidy on low hourly wages rather than earnings. Furthermore, the HWS is to be paid permanently (until retirement) rather than temporarily as in case of the already existing Earnings Insurance.
The reason is that we would neither expect long-run employment effects from the latter, nor would it be possible to analyse the long-term effects of a time-limited programme on the basis of the empirical framework employed here.
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One fundamental problem in analysing such a programme is that the amount of the subsidy is not known a priori, because it would depend on the unobserved reservation wage of 9 the potential participant in the programme. In order to determine the wage subsidy we derive for each non-working individual in our sample two 'counterfactual' wages, the individual's reservation wages and her or his expected market wage at the start of a new job. As described in section 2, these counterfactual wages are estimated on the basis of selectivity-corrected wage equations. Since marked differences between men and women as well as between east and west Germany persist, we have estimated the wage equations separately by gender and region (see Table A1 in the appendix).
The explanatory variable in the wage equation of main interest for our analysis is firm tenure. 4 For the calculation of the wage subsidy we assume that an individual's reservation wage depends on her or his last wage, and thus tenure in the previous job, whereas the market wage is set equal to the expected individual wage at zero tenure. The difference between these two wages measures an individual's earnings gap and determines the size of the HWS. 5 In order to close the gap between the market and the reservation wage the market wage needs to be increased by about 15%, on average. As shown in Table A2 in the appendix, the average earnings gap varies between 5% for east German men and almost 25% for east German women, and also varies substantial with tenure within each group.
(ii) In-Work Credit (IWC)
In several OECD countries in-work credits have been introduced both as an anti-poverty policy and as a measure to make work pay (OECD 2005b, Bargain and Orsini 2006) . Most prominent examples are the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA and the Working (Family)
Tax Credit in the UK (see, e.g., Hotz and Scholz 2003 , Blundell et al. 2000 , Haan and Myck 2006 . Whereas these in-work credits are typically targeted at poor families with children, the In-Work Credit (IWC) proposed here is conditioned on age and employment status. The target group of the IWC is the same as for the HWS, namely individuals aged between 55 and 64 years currently not working. The requirement for this group is to take up work for at least 16 hours per week. As eligibility to the IWC is based on household income, for couples it is sufficient that one spouse fulfils the relevant criteria.
The proposed IWC is designed as follows: Up to a yearly gross household income of 6,750 Euro households receive the maximum credit of 7,100 Euro, above this level the credit is withdrawn at a rate of 37%. Gross income includes income from dependent work, 4
For the working population this information is explicitly coded in the data. For the non-working population we had to construct this information from their job histories available in the SOEP. Since we do not observe job-to-job changes in the data, our estimate of the tenure variable has to be interpreted as an upper bound.
self employment and pensions. For full time work, more than 30 hour per week, households receive an extra annual bonus of 990 Euro, which is also withdrawn at a rate of 37%. As we show in section 4.1 below, the IWC is particularly attractive for single households with low earnings potential, whereas the modest income threshold makes this programme less relevant for couple households when at least one of the spouses is already working.
(iii) Employment Bonus (EB)
The design of this programme follows a similar one existing in Belgium under the name Employment Bonus (see Bargain et al. 2005) , with the main difference being that here eligibility again is conditioned on age and an individual's employment status. The EB differs from the IWC as it is based on individual wages rather than household income and subsidises the employee's social security contributions which amount to roughly 20% in Germany. The EB also differs from the existing subsidy of so-called 'mini-jobs' which are completely or partly exempted from employees' social security contributions, as described in section 2.2 above. On the top of this subsidy, the EB introduces a maximum bonus of 215 Euro per month for eligible persons working full time with an earnings threshold of 1,500 Euro per month. This guarantees that only low-wage people receive the subsidy and distinguishes the EB from the HWS for which all currently non-working individuals in the relevant age group are eligible regardless of their hourly wage. Hence, the EB provides stronger incentives for low-skilled older unemployed people.
Empirical Methodology
To analyse the effects of the three reform proposals described in the previous section on work incentives and household labour supply we use our behavioural micro-simulation model STSM. 6 The model is based on the SOEP and basically consists of two parts: a tax-benefit calculator that computes net household incomes for each sample household on the basis of information on gross incomes, and for different (hypothetical) legislations and different working hours of individuals; and an empirical labour supply model with household utility depending on net household income and leisure of both spouses (in case of couple households). On the basis of this model we can analyse changes in work incentives and labour supply effects under different reform scenarios and perform welfare analyses of these reforms.
The household labour supply model is specified as a discrete choice model on the assumption that a household can choose among a finite number J+1 of working hours 
The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and maximised to estimate the parameters of the utility function U. We assume a quadratic specification of the utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000) . For a couples household, the systematic part of the utility function is thus given by: where X 1 , X 2 , X 3 are column vectors including age, number and age of children, disability indicators, and region of residence., and the α's are (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated jointly with the remaining β coefficients given in the utility function above. In the estimation we do not consider potential effects of unobserved heterogeneity, which implies that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property is assumed to hold. However, Haan (2006) has shown that labour supply elasticities, estimated on the same data as in the present study, do not differ significantly when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced.
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The model is estimated separately for couple households with both spouses' labour supply assumed to be flexible (3931 households), for couples with only one spouse's labour supply flexible (1609), and for single households (1043 single women and 796 single men).
The utility function and the derivation of the choice probabilities of single household are analogous to the case of a couples household, except that the utility function contains only one leisure term for the respective individual. We estimate the model separately for single men, single women and couple households on a restricted sample of households with at least one adult is aged between 20 and 64, not in education and not self-employed. We specify 6
hours categories according to the actual distribution of hours in the sample: non-employment, three part-time categories, full-time and overtime work. The distribution of hours for the various groups of households is given in Table A3 in the appendix. In our non-linear model labour supply effects need to be derived numerically. Instead of the 'aggregated frequencies' technique, that is aggregating the expected individual hour supply over the whole sample, we follow the calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level (Creedy and Duncan 2002) . It consists of drawing for each household a set of J+1 random terms from the EVI distribution until a vector of random terms is found that generates a perfect match between predicted and observed hour supply. In a second step, the draws are used for predicting labour supply responses to a tax reform, and averaging them over a large number of draws provides robust transition matrices. How Would the Reforms Affect Work Incentives and Labour Supply?
Work incentives: effects of the reforms on household budget constraints
To assess the work incentive effects of the three policy reforms, in the following we present their impacts on the budget constraints of several stylised households which qualify for the transfer programmes derived on the basis of the tax-benefit micro-simulation model STSM for fiscal year 2005. Figure 1a shows the effects of the three reforms on the budget constraint of a single person with a relatively low expected hourly wage, which we have set equal to the 25%-tile of the wage observed for men in our sample; this person is assumed to be eligible to meanstested income support, such as Unemployment Benefit II (see section 2). For employment exceeding 16 hours per week the IWC would lead to a relatively strong increase in net household income (by roughly 280 Euro). Although withdrawn at a rate of 37%, the amount of the IWC is still significant even when working full-time, which is partly due to the full time bonus at 30 hours. Comparing the EB and the HWS, there is very little difference in their effects on net household incomes. In both cases, net household incomes would only differ from the status quo at higher levels of working hours, i.e. beyond the subsidy range for 'Mini-Jobs'. Looking at the same type of household but assuming that he or she is not eligible to means tested income support, Figure 1b shows basically the same picture regarding the financial incentives induced by the three reforms as described above, except for the obvious difference that taking up a low-wage job may become financially attractive even at low hours.
For couple households the effects of the reforms on budget constraints are different as the household context needs to be considered. This is particularly important for the IWC. − Single household working at 25th percentile hourly wage of men aged [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] , no children. − Couple household, one spouse working at 25th percentile hourly wage of men, no children; eligible to UB II. − Couple household, both spouse working, the husband works 40 hours at 25th percentile hourly wage of men aged 55-64 (12.36 Euro), the wife works full-time at the respective 25th percentile hourly wage (10,39 Euro); eligible to UB II. 
Labour supply effects
In order to evaluate the labour supply effects of the three policy reforms we simulate for each household in our sample the change in the level of net household incomes implied by each of the three reforms based on STSM, and then estimate the labour supply effects induced by these income changes, as described section 4.
In Table 4 we summarize grossed-up simulation results for the three policy reforms. In addition to the effects of the reforms on labour force participation, we also calculate their impact on working hours. The hours effects are decomposed by previous labour market status into changes for the new participants and for the working population, calculated as full-time equivalents assuming 40 weekly working hours. Table A2 in the appendix summarizes the labour force participation and hours effects of the three reforms relative to, respectively, the non-working and working population aged between 55 and 64 years.
The overall labour supply effects of the three scenarios are moderate and of similar size.
Note, however, that the reform only affects households with at least one unemployed adult aged between 55 and 64. For women the effects range between roughly 20,000 and 30,000 new participants. For men, the effects are smaller, about 13,000 for the IWC, slightly higher for the EB, and about 24,000 for the HWS. Relative to the non-working population the labour supply effects for men range between 1.7% and 3.4%. These numbers outweigh the relative effects for women as the non working female population is larger. By definition the contrary is true for the effects relative to the working population (see Table A4 ).
Labour supply effects differ by gender and between singles and couples households due to the design of the programmes. As mentioned above, both the EB and the HWS are conditioned on individual rather than household incomes. Therefore, for these programmes we do not find the small or even negative participation effects for couple households as in the case of the IWC. Whereas the latter provides negative disincentives for the second earner in couple households, for couples with both spouses working there are positive incentive for labour supply behaviour. We estimate an overall small positive participation effect of the IWC for women living in couples households.
For single households, the IWC has a stronger positive effect than the HWS and the EB. This is due to the above mentioned generosity of the IWC for single households over a large part of the hours distribution. Comparing the labour supply effect of the HWS with the EB, we find slightly higher effects for the wage subsidy. This is not surprising as the HWS is not conditioned on household income or dependent on some income threshold, as the other two programmes are. 
Singles 6 6 6 0 6 6 6 0 (2 -10) (2 -9) (2 -9) (4 -8) (4 -8) (4 -8) (1 -2) (7 -11) (8 -13) (8 -11) (1 -2) Singles 5 5 5 0 7 7 7 0 (2 -7) (2 -6) (2 -6) (4 -8) (5 -9) (5 -9) The increase in working hours mainly results from previously unemployed people participating in the labour market due to the reforms. However, in couple households hours worked slightly decrease as the partner of the eligible spouse is also affected by the reform. In line with the design of the reforms, we find that new participants induced to enter the labour market by the HWS or the EB want to work full-time. The participation effects and the corresponding full time equivalents are of similar size. For the IWC, however, the results imply that the new participants tend to work part-time which is due to the withdrawal of the IWC with increasing gross earnings.
Welfare Implications
In addition to the labour supply effects of the alternative policy reforms analysed in the previous section, their welfare implications are of interest for policy evaluation. In practical policy discussions, the welfare measure typically used simply is the average income gain (or loss) induced by the reform. A theoretically more appropriate welfare measure is based on the monetary equivalent of the average change in the level of utility induced by some reform.
Following King (1981) , we calculate the compensating variation (CV) as a monetary measure of the average change in welfare. CV is defined as the minimum amount by which a consumer (worker) would have to be compensated after a price (wage) change in order to be as well off as before. In the present context, the policy reforms analysed raise the relative wage for unemployed workers taking up a job. In this case, the compensating variation thus measures the average monetary amount eligible people would have to be given to make them equally well of if the policy reform had not been implemented. This measure has the advantage that, instead of simply comparing households gaining and losing in terms of household income, the utility loss associated with the reduced leisure of people induced to participate in the labour market due to the reform is accounted for in the calculation of the overall welfare gain of the reform. − Average income and welfare effects are rounded to the nearest Euro, aggregate effects to the nearest 1,000
Euro.
− The welfare effect is measured as compensating variation.
Source: Simulation results based on STSM.
Income and welfare effects of the three reforms for household directly affected by the reform are summarised in For single women, too, the largest average income gain is obtained for the HWS, whereas the IWC would result in a somewhat larger gain than the EB. In contrast, for single men the IWC would lead to the highest income gains, whereas the lowest gains would result for the HWS.
In general, we find that the income effect exceeds the welfare effects. 7 This is because only previously unemployed older people who take up work become eligible to a subsidy under each of the three reforms and, given that leisure is a normal good, need to be compensated for their loss of leisure. As indicated by the relatively large difference in estimated income gains and welfare effects, this is particular true for single households, and single men in particular.
The lower part of Table 5 summarizes aggregate income and welfare effects for the eligible population as a whole. Overall, the HWS would result in the strongest increase in both income and welfare amounting to roughly 250 and 170 million Euro per year, respectively. Aggregate income and welfare effects for the other two policy reforms would be substantially smaller, but still substantial. Net budgetary costs would be negative for all three reforms analysed here ranging from about 40 million Euro per year for the IWC to almost 200 million Euro for the HWS. Depending on the way these induced tax receipts are distributed in the population, there could be second-order effects modifying simulated income and welfare gains for the three reforms. However, assuming that these additional funds are distributed as a lump-sum to all households, these effects would be minimal.
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Welfare effects are usually analysed under the assumption of budgetary balance, where the net costs of a specific programme are financed by a lump sum tax. Accounting for behavioural effects, net costs turned out to differ between the three policies analysed but are negative in each case. Since a lump sum transfer distributing the resulting surplus would amount to less than 1 Euro per month, and thus not make any difference to the numbers shown in table, we neglect this issue here.
Summary and Policy Conclusions
The employment rate and the incidence of long-term unemployment are very high among older people in Germany, both in absolute terms and compared to most other OECD countries. We have shown that hourly wages of older workers still employed exceed the average wage in the working population by a large margin, especially in case of men, and that the age distribution of wages is strongly affected by selection effects regarding individual employment decisions. Controlling these effects, estimated hourly wages for both older men and women are very close to the average wage in the male and female population, although there is a significant wage reduction relative to the hourly wage estimated for the age group 45 -54 years. These estimates indicate that the relatively high wage level of older workers is supported by their low employment rate which, in turn, is the result of older workers with relatively low earnings potential dropping out of the labour force.
These age differences in labour market outcomes are likely to be related to institutional factors, such as the widespread use of early retirement schemes in conjunction with the unemployment insurance system. Recent reforms have, on the one hand, attempted to reduce financial incentives for long-term unemployment and early retirement, and implemented various wage subsidies targeted at long-term unemployed workers, on the other hand. These wage subsidies seem to have been not very success so far, which may be related to the insufficient coordination with other means-tested income support and the way they have been implemented, in particular insufficient targeting and relatively short time limits.
In contrast to existing wage subsidies in Germany, the three policy reforms we have analysed in this paper -an hourly wage subsidy, an in-work tax credit, and the employment bonus -are not time limited, targeted at unemployed people above the age of 55 years, and restricted to regular employment. We find that the simulated employment effects of the three policy reforms would be rather similar and of moderate size, ranging between 20,000 and 30,000 additionally employed older women and between 10,000 and 20,000 older men.
Average monthly incomes of eligible previously unemployed people who take up work increase substantially, on average, where income effects vary substantially both between the three reforms and by household type. Our results also suggest that the hourly wage subsidy yields the highest welfare gains if measured at the individual (household) level using the compensating variation as monetary welfare measure. Since empirical labour supply elasticities differ between elderly men and women, and between single and couple households, the relative size of income and welfare effects varies between these groups as well as between programmes.
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All three reforms analysed here would be self-financing in the sense that net budgetary costs are estimated to be negative, ranging from about 40 million Euro per year for the inwork credit to almost 200 million Euro for the hourly wage subsidy. This optimistic scenario depends on the possibility to restrict eligibility to any of the three subsidies to currently unemployed older people. Thus, we have to assume that the actual implementation of such a policy measure would not induce currently employed older people to become unemployed and thereby eligible to the subsidy. It should be stressed that for the policy reforms analysed here such an entitlement effect seems more likely than under the already existing wage subsidies targeted at older unemployed people. The reason is that the subsidies analysed here are permanent rather than limited to a relatively brief time period. However, the time-limit of existing wage subsidies to older workers may also explain their very limited success: If there are no long-term productivity effects from participating in the programme, there would be no long-term employment effect after the subsidy has expired. One possibility would perhaps be to combine a time-limited wage subsidy and subsidized vocational training programmes, but there seems to be little empirical evidence, both for Germany and in international comparison, that training programmes are effective for older workers. − Two-stage estimation of selection model (Heckman 1979) on pooled data for the period 1995-2003. − The variable human capital depreciation is a weighted sum of years of previous unemployment; a constant, time and regional dummies (at the state level) as well as dummies for industry and firm size are included in both equations. The sign "×" indicates an interaction term.
Appendix
− For all groups the joint tenure effect is highly significant according to an F test of joint significance.
Source: SOEP, waves 1995 -2003. Note: The relative wage subsidy is calculated as ratio (in %) of the amount of the subsidy relative to the expected market wage.
Source: SOEP 2003; own calculations based on wage regressions in Table A1 . − Full time equivalents are defined as 40 weekly working hours. − Eligible population are all individuals aged between 55-64 and not working (0.7 million men, and 1.4 million women). Working population are all individuals aged between 55-64 working (2 million men, and 1.8 million women).
Source: SOEP 2003; calculations based on empirical household labour supply model as described in the text.
